Introduction
Over the past thirty years, there has been an increasing scientific interest in using evolutionary theory to explain human economic behaviour. Since the advocacy of this approach by Becker (1976) and Hirshleifer (1977) , Darwinian (1859) thinking has been used to explain the evolution of human risk preference (Rubin & Paul II 1979) , time preference (Hansson & Stuart 1990 , Rogers 1994 , Robson & Samuelson 2007 , Robson & Szentes 2008 , and the shape of utility functions (Netzer 2009) . 1 More recently, evolutionary theory has been applied to the emergence of modern economic growth. Galor and Moav (2002) developed a unified growth model in which natural selection favours traits that affect the economic environment. This model was the first to use frequency changes of heritable traits to explain the shift of human populations from Malthusian stagnation to modern economic growth. Galor and Moav proposed a geneencoded preference for quality or quantity of children, which is similar to r/K selection in behavioural ecology. The quantity-quality trade-off has been hypothesised as an economic factor by, among others, Becker (1960) , and Becker and Lewis (1974) . Becker et al. (1990) considered the link between the quantity-quality trade-off and economic growth. Galore and Moav (2002) investigated the dynamics of their model analytically using phase diagrams. In this paper, their model is analysed numerically by simulation. The method is similar to the one that Lagerlof (2006) used to simulate the model of Galor and Weil (2000) . 3 The advantage of simulation is that it allows exploration of a richer specification of models for which there exists no closed-form solution. In particular, it will be possible to consider more than two genotypes with different preference for quality and quantity of children, which may emerge either though migration or mutation. This allows a demonstration of the susceptibility of the modern high-growth state to invasion by cheaters. The extended model suggests the possibility of a return to Malthusian conditions after the modern period of economic growth rather than a permanent continuation of growth.
Background
Besides Galor and Moav (2002) , several other authors applied evolutionary theory in the analysis of economic growth and the transition from the Malthusian state to modern rates of growth. In their seminal paper on the evolution of preferences for saving and labour supply, Hansson and Stuart (1990) proposed that human preferences depend on the availability of resources. Harsh natural environments select for genotypes that have a stronger preference for saving, leading to an equilibrium with low population density and high per-capita capital. Selected traits include a preference for work and accumulation of physical capital. This might explain why humans left the Malthusian state first in regions with harsh winters. Clark (2007) suggested that selection for certain heritable characteristics accounted for the Industrial Revolution. While open as to whether these traits were transmitted genetically or culturally, he found higher reproductive success among wealthy males in England between 1250 and 1800. 4 He hypothesised that individuals with favoured traits such as a propensity to hard work and saving increased in frequency during this time.
This change in population composition could then have provided the basis for the Industrial Revolution.
The increasing availability of population genetic data, such as Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) , has led to more research. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) linked differences in economic development with the genetic distance between populations, which depends on the time elapsed since two populations shared a common ancestor. They proposed that genetic distance increases income differences because it may act as a barrier to the diffusion of technological development between populations. As genetic distance is based on neutral genes that are not subject to selection pressure, their hypothesis does not rely on any difference in economic traits between populations. Differences in income may arise merely by chance and the failure of technological advances to diffuse through the genetic distance barrier.
Recently, Ashraf and Galor (2010) proposed that the geographic distance of a population from Africa has affected the level of growth and development across regions. They found that populations with elevated or reduced genetic diversity have experienced the lowest level of economic development since the Industrial Revolution.
5
Indigenous populations of the Americas have the lowest level of genetic diversity due to the founder effect, whereas Africans have the highest. 6 The hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and economic development is due to a trade-off between the costs and benefits of genetic diversity. A high level of genetic diversity expands the production possibilities through complementarities in knowledge production but disrupts the diffusion of technology due to lower levels of trust and cooperation between dissimilar individuals. Galor and Moav (2002) developed an overlapping generations model, with each agent living for two periods (childhood and adulthood). In childhood, agents are passive and 5 Genetic diversity was measured using expected heterozygosity, an index of the probability that two individuals, selected at random from the relevant population, are genetically different from one another. 6 The founder effect is the loss of genetic diversity that occurs when a small subset of a larger population establishes a new population.
The Galor and Moav model
they receive education. During adulthood, agents decide on how much time to dedicate to work or childrearing and they choose the number of children and their education.
Reproduction is asexual by a single parent. 
1-α is the labour share of production. The level of technology, A t , is determined endogenously in the model.
Assuming there are no property rights over land, the return to land is zero and the wage per efficiency unit of labour, w t , is the output per unit of labour,
where The population consists of two genotypes (i = a, b) with different preferences between the quality and quantity of their children. The utility function is:
where is the consumption of an individual with genotype i in period t, is the number of children, and is the level of human capital of each child. The parameter γ measures the relative weight of children in the utility function, and the parameter β i determines the weight that a genotype i individual gives to the quality of children. Both parameters are inherited without change by the subsequent generations.
In adulthood, agents have one unit of time that they allocate between childrearing and participation in the labour market. Potential income, , is the maximum income that could be earned if the agent's entire time endowment was devoted to labour force participation:
A parent incurs a base time cost, τ, for each child, with an additional time cost to educate the child to the level of education . is the total cost of raising a family with n children and 1 is the time left for working. Thus, the budget constraint faced in adulthood is:
Human capital is a function of education and the technological environment. Education increases human capital, while technological progress reduces the usefulness of existing human capital. The function for human capital and the conditions it must satisfy are as follows:
Human capital increases at a diminishing rate with education ( ), it is eroded at a decreasing rate by technological progress (g t+1 ), and technological progress strengthens the effect of education on human capital. Human capital is normalised to one in the absence of education and technological progress.
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (3), a genotype i parent of generation t faces the following optimisation problem:
ln ln , subject to income being enough to meet the subsistence level of consumption .
, 0 6 The fertility of a genotype i individual varies across three scenarios: where the subsistence constraint does not bind, where it binds, and where potential income is insufficient to meet the subsistence level of consumption. Taking the first order condition of equation (7) with respect to gives fertility when the constraint does not bind; solving equation (8) as an equality gives fertility where the constraint binds; and no children are born when the parent is reduced to the subsistence level of consumption.
These three scenarios are shown in equation (9):
where ̃≡ 1
The number of children depends positively on potential income and negatively on the time cost of childrearing. Above the critical value , only the time costs of childrearing matter. No children are born when the parent is reduced to the subsistence level of consumption.
Taking the first-order condition of equation (7) with respect to the second choice variable e t+1 gives:
The first term represents the utility benefit of a marginal increase in investment in the quality of children. The utility benefit of education depends positively on the partial derivative of the human capital function h e and the weight given to the quality of children in the utility function . The second term is the utility benefit of a marginal increase in investment in the quantity of children. Optimal behaviour requires that the marginal benefit of education equals the marginal benefit of additional children if the parent chooses a positive level of education.
The following condition ensures that the level of education is positive for those with the highest valuation for quality ( i = 1) when technological progress is zero:
If equation (11) is not satisfied, no agents will educate their children, leading to a permanent Malthusian state.
The average level of education in the population, e t , is: 
where is the fraction of time used by genotype i for labour:
Equation (15) reflects the growing allocation of time to child rearing when potential income increases. When income reaches the critical value , the fraction of time used for child rearing reaches a maximum of γ, leaving the fraction (1- for labour.
Using equations (14) and (15), the aggregate labour supply is:
Response curves
Despite each genotype having a fixed preference for quality, this does not result in a fixed level of investment in education over time as the return to education changes with the rate of technological progress. However, the agents' education response curve to the rate of technological progress is fixed. Figure 1 shows how much time each genotype invests into education at a given level of technological progress, with the quality-preferring genotype a investing more in education at all rates of technological progress. The shape of the response curves is based on simulations of the model in section 8. 7 The inequality (11) guarantees that quality-preferring genotype a parents always choose a positive level of education for their children. The higher fitness of the quality-preferring genotype in the Malthusian state and the quantity-preferring type in the modern growth state is akin to the classical r/K selection theory in evolutionary biology. Individuals that use the r strategy produce many offspring, each of which has a low probability of surviving to adulthood, while K strategists produce fewer offspring in which they invest more heavily, giving them a higher probability of surviving to adulthood. 8 r strategists exploit less crowded ecological niches, while K strategists are favoured in more crowded environments. This behaviour occurs in the Galor and Moav model. In the Malthusian state, where resources are scarce and the economy is effectively crowded, the quality-preferring genotype has higher fitness. In the modern growth regime, the economy has become uncrowded, giving higher fitness to the quantity-preferring genotype.
The education and fertility response functions in Figures 1 and 2 allow limited phenotypic plasticity in the form of varying the level of education in response to technological progress. However, there is no flexibility in other dimensions. In particular, there is no fine-tuning of the response to economic growth to optimise fitness. In the modern growth era, quality-preferring parents engage in a self-defeating strategy of overeducating their children that affects their fitness. Additional flexibility in the education response could materially affect model predictions.
Functional forms
To simulate the model, functional forms for and g t+1 are needed. The following function for matches most of the requirements given in equation (6):
,
This function does not fulfil the condition that h eg > 0 for all values of and g t+1 , but
this is only a sufficient and not a necessary condition. Simulating the model of Galor The parameter m is included in equation (17) to allow the condition in equation (11) to be met. Using Lagerlof's definition of a = ρτ, m must be bigger than 1.
This condition ensures that a quality-preferring genotype with β a = 1 will invest in education when there is no economic growth. The parameter r is selected produce modern rates of education and economic growth. A simple functional form for equation (13) is the power function:
Using equations (10) and (17), the level of education that each genotype gives to its children is:
This equation indicates that education in period t+1 is a function of the rate of technological progress in period t+1, which in turn is a function of the average level of education in period t. This link between education in one period and the next is crucial for the transition out of the Malthusian state.
The dynamical system
The dynamics of the system can be captured in a system of six difference equations that describe the behaviour of the endogenous variables A t , g t , , , and . Before defining these equations, and must be expressed in terms of the endogenous variables.
Collecting equations (2), (4), (16) and (17), potential income per worker equals:
As H t is a function of , equation (21) agents apply all of their time to labour and they decide on how to apportion the income from that labour between consumption and childrearing. Accordingly, equation (16) changes to:
This modification does not qualitatively change the simulations but does dampen population perturbations, allowing for a more stable model that is less prone to extinctions of the agents.
Equation (21) becomes:
Equations (9), (19) and (22) yield the number of children:
The dynamical system for the six endogenous variables is:
, , , , , ; ∈ , is chosen because it produces a realistic level of education in the modern growth era. The parameter , which is the same for both genotypes, determines the relative weight of children in the utility function. As modern fertility in developed countries is generally below replacement,  is set to achieve zero population growth in the high-growth era, Setting a in equation (17) far below 1 or m much above that required by equation (18) tends to increase population perturbations, so we set a = 0.99*τ and m = 2, satisfying inequality (18) and minimising perturbations. r = 0.151 yields the chosen equilibrium values of education and economic growth in the modern growth era.
Parameter values
11 This value is in the range of the estimate of expenditure on children as a proportion of GDP made by Haveman and Wolfe (1995) , although Haveman and Wolfe's calculation included education expenditure, which is separate from τ in the model. 
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Finally, initial values must be chosen. The initial education is zero and hence initial economic growth is zero. Initial technology, A, and land, X, are set equal to 1. At time zero, the number of genotype a and b individuals is assumed to be =0.001 and =0.665. This is close to the equilibrium population in the first period. Using equation (21), the level of income in the first period is approximately 1.18, which is above subsistence but such that the subsistence constraint still binds (as it is below ̃ = 1/(1-γ) = 1.26).
Simulation results
The model explains the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern economic growth, which occurred during the Industrial Revolution in the late 18 th and early 19 th centuries. Initiating the simulation shortly before the beginning of the second millennium, the take-off occurs after about 45 generations or 900 years. The length of time to the take-off depends on the initial proportion of genotype a and b individuals.
The transition phase from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth lasts about six generations or 120 years. In that interval, the rate of technological progress surges from 1 per cent per annum to 5.7 per cent and income growth rises to the modern growth rate of 2.3 per cent per annum. Population growth increases until the time of the take-off, at which time it drops to zero during the transition phase. Figure 3 displays the behaviour of the annual growth rates of technology, income and population, and Figure 4 shows the log-levels of these variables. This may not be the case, however, as in the Galor and Moav model there is no quantity-quality trade-off apparent at the population level during the Malthusian state.
One source of pre-industrial data is from wills in England, as detailed in Clark and
Hamilton (2006), Clark (2007) and Cummins (2009a, 2009b) . 14 Another empirical issue with the Galor and Moav model is the population dynamics.
The decline in the fertility of the quality-preferring genotype during the transition out of the Malthusian state is consistent with the early decline in fertility among the wealthy, which Cummins (2009b, 2010) documented. However, the Galor and Moav model predicts that the population will stabilise during the transition phase, which is too early. High rates of population growth persisted in Great Britain and other industrial countries to the end of the 19 th century. This presents an issue for the Galor and Moav model and other models that incorporate a quantity-quality trade-off. If an increase in child quality is expected to drive the transition to a modern growth state, a contemporaneous change in quantity might be expected due to the presence of the trade-off.
15 13 Clark and Cummins are assembling a larger data set that will improve the robustness of the results and allow for additional controls to be included such as birth order and gender composition of siblings.
Population perturbations in the Malthusian state
The simulation of the Galor and Moav model produces population cycles during the Malthusian state. Considering the Galor and Weil model, Lagerlof (2006) explained the endogenous cycles as follows:
"When population in the current period is large, land per agent is low, and per capita income close to subsistence. Thus fertility is close to zero and population in the next period pushed almost to extinction. This makes next period's per capita incomes high, spurring a phase of population growth until overpopulation sets in and the cycle starts all over again."
We can make some further observations about these population cycles. First, the cycles are irregular perturbations that do not settle into a clear pattern. Second, they are highly dependent on the initial conditions. As shown by May (1976) , a first-order difference equation can produce a large array of behaviours from stable points to apparently random cycles within a single functional form. In this section, it is shown that population growth in the Malthusian era is defined by a first order difference equation
and that the pre-industrial population cycles hinge on the fixed time cost of childrearing.
In the early Malthusian state, the quantity-preferring genotype b dominates the population. Genotype b adults do not educate their children, resulting in a population of:
If ̃ , as would be the case during the Malthusian era, and setting , , and X equal to 1, the population equation simplifies to:
Setting L* = L t = L t+1 , the equilibrium for the population is * 1 ⁄ . The equilibrium is unstable if ⁄ |1|. Taking the derivative of equation (26) yields: 1 If less than 100 iterations are performed, the population may survive for some starting values below 0.17, suggesting that the population may not become extinct if the take-off out of Malthusian state occurs early enough. In the models explored in this paper, the slight technological progress due to the presence of genotype also increases the probability of survival for some starting values.
Model extension -mutation and migration
Galor and Moav did not use their model to consider the possibility of the evolution of new genotypes with different preferences over quality and quantity of children. As there is no mutation or migration, the genetic makeup of the population alters only because the prevalence of each genotype changes over time. While this is immaterial for the short transition phase out of the Malthusian state, it is relevant for the Malthusian era before the emergence of modern economic growth and it matters for the stability of the modern growth era. In this section, we show that the number of genotypes affects the predictions of the Galor and Moav model. The main finding is that a growing economy may regress to Malthusian conditions if a third genotype emerges that values education less than the other two.
Using the same utility function as before, the quantity-quality preference parameters for the three genotypes are: β a = 1.0, β b = 0.85 and β c = 0.7. All other parameters of the model are the same as in Table 1 , except the initial levels of the subpopulations, which are . , . and . . Thus, both the quality-preferring genotype a and the new strongly quantity-preferring genotype c are minute minorities at the beginning of the simulation, which may have emerged through mutation or migration. technological progress has ended and income growth is negative. The fall in per capita income continues until it has returned to the initial Malthusian level by about generation 260. Since technological progress is permanent, the economy supports a much higher population during the second Malthusian era. Figure 9 displays the growth rates of technology, population and income, and Figure 10 shows the level of these variables. Eventually, the genotype c individuals will dominate the population and drive the economy back into Malthusian conditions.
Conclusion
The simulation of the Galor and Moav model results in a pattern of income and population growth that resembles the period of Malthusian stagnation and the take-off into a modern growth era. However, the timing of the demographic transition concurrent with the commencement of income growth is not consistent with empirical evidence that the demographic transition occurred several generations after the initial take-off.
This highlights issues with the quantity-quality trade-off mechanism that underlies the model and suggests that alternative or additional factors should be considered.
The simulation has also demonstrated that the model is heavily dependent on the selection of parameters, with minor variations in preference for quality or the resource cost per child substantially modifying the model outcomes. One area of fragility is the cyclical behaviour in the Malthusian era, which Lagerlof (2006) also observed in his
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1.E+21 simulation of the Galor and Weil (2000) model. The present paper identifies the first order difference equation that determines the population dynamics as the cause of the oscillations and describes how the time cost of children variable influences their nature.
The instability of the model also extends to the biological features. If the model includes more than the two genotypes with fixed preferences between quantity and quality, the modern growth state is not stable and is susceptible to invasion by a strongly quantitypreferring genotype. This can return the population to the Malthusian state and in the case of the scenario examined, the final Malthusian state is permanent.
The simulation exercise highlights a number of possible further considerations relevant to a biological evolution theory of the Industrial Revolution. Consideration could be given to the individuals having a higher degree of phenotypic plasticity, in that they have some flexibility in their response to technological progress. This could allow quality-preferring types to reduce their response to technological progress where it is clear that fertility was being substantially hampered by their over-investment in education. Phenotypic plasticity could add some robustness to the modern-growth state by allowing quality-preferring types to maintain a share of the total population. hb<-(m*eb+a)/(eb+r*g+a) za<-ha*((A*X/(L*(qa*ha+qb*hb)))^alpha) zb<-hb*((A*X/(L*(qa*ha+qb*hb)))^alpha) #level of education of each genotype ea<-max(0, (1/(2*m))*((Ba*m*r*g+Ba*m*a-Ba*a-m*r*g-a*m-a) +(((Ba*m*r*g+Ba*m*a-Ba*a-m*r*g-a*m-a)^2+4*m*(Ba*m*r*g*Tau+Ba*m*a*TauBa*a*Tau-a*r*g-a^2))^0.5))) eb<-max(0, (1/(2*m))*((Bb*m*r*g+Bb*m*a-Bb*a-m*r*g-a*m-a) +(((Bb*m*r*g+Bb*m*a-Bb*a-m*r*g-a*m-a)^2+4*m*(Bb*m*r*g*Tau+Bb*m*a*TauBb*a*Tau-a*r*g-a^2))^0. 
